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Abstract
We use micro–level data to analyze emerging markets’ private sector access to international
debt markets during sovereign debt crises. Using ﬁxed eﬀect analysis, we ﬁnd that these crises
are systematically accompanied by a decline in foreign credit domestic private ﬁrms, both during
debt renegotiations and for over two years after the restructuring agreements are reached. This
decline is large (over 20 percent), statistically signiﬁcant, and robust when we control for a
host of fundamentals. We ﬁnd that this eﬀect is concentrated in the nonﬁnancial sector and is
diﬀerent for exporters and for ﬁrms in the non–exporting sector. We also ﬁnd that the magnitude
of the eﬀect depends on the type of debt restructuring agreement.
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11 Introduction
In the last two decades of the 20th century, emerging markets experienced a lending boom. Not
surprisingly, this boom was accompanied by a number of sovereign debt restructuring episodes,
many of which were followed by economic crises of varying severity in the aﬀected countries. One
channel through which economic activity can be aﬀected by sovereign debt restructuring is the
tightening of external ﬁnancial constraints for the private ﬁrms. This may be an important channel,
because international capital market has become an important source of funds for the emerging
markets’ private sector. Throughout the lending boom, private sector borrowing accounted for
over 30% of total net capital inﬂows to emerging markets.1 Now about 25% of emerging markets’
corporate bonds and bank credit are external, and this number is much larger for Latin American
emerging economies.2
To our knowledge, this paper presents the ﬁrst systematic analysis of the eﬀects of sovereign
debt crises on the foreign credit to the private sector. Recent empirical work has found various
changes in private sector credit patterns in the aftermath of ﬁnancial crises (Blalock, Gertler,
and Levine, 2004; Desai, Foley, and Forbes, 2004; Eichengreen, Hale, and Mody, 2001; Tomz and
Wright, 2005) as well as changes in stock market behavior (Kallberg, Liu, and Pasquariello, 2002;
Pasquariello, 2005). The empirical literature regarding the eﬀects of sovereign debt crises has
focused on the impact on sovereign borrowing.3 We focus on the short- and medium–run eﬀects of
sovereign debt crises on private ﬁrms’ access to foreign credit. In our exercise, we do not estimate
the probability of sovereign debt crises; instead, we take these events as given and analyze their ex
1See, for example, Chapter 4 of Global Development Finance, The World Bank, 2005.
2See Chapter 4 of the Global Financial Stability Report, IMF, April 2005.
3Eichengreen and Lindert (1989) ﬁnd that sovereign default does not seem to inﬂuence future access of sovereigns
to the capital market. This ﬁnding is conﬁrmed in a recent study by Gelos, Sahay, and Sandleris (2004) — they ﬁnd
that the probability of the sovereign’s market access is not strongly inﬂuenced by the sovereign default. On the other
side of the debate, Ozler (1993) claims that the countries can only reenter the credit market after settling old debts,
and Tomz and Wright (2005) ﬁnd that over the last 200 years “about half of all defaults led to exclusion from capital
markets for a period of more than 12 years.”
2post eﬀects.
Debt restructuring is not a discrete event, but rather a process that in many cases involves
a substantial period of time. Because it is possible that the response of both borrowing ﬁrms
and foreign investors is diﬀerent during debt renegotiations than it is after the ﬁnal restructuring
agreement, we construct data on the onset of debt renegotiations and consider separately the eﬀects
of the renegotiations and the eﬀects of reaching the restructuring agreement. We also analyze the
eﬀects of diﬀerent types of debt restructuring agreements.
Sovereign debt crisis can lead to reduced foreign credit to private domestic ﬁrms via the
decline in supply, as lenders’ perceptions of country risk worsen (Drudi and Giordano, 2000), via
the decline in aggregate demand that is triggered by a sovereign debt crisis and its resolution
(Dooley and Verma, 2003; Tomz and Wright, 2005), and via exogenous shocks that aﬀect both
the probability of sovereign debt crisis and the amount of foreign credit to the private sector. We
provide an intuitive discussion of these channels. While our empirical methodology does not allow
us to distinguish between the demand and the supply eﬀects, we address the possibility of a common
shock.
Our micro–level data on foreign bond issuance and foreign syndicated bank loan contracts come
from Bondware and Loanware and cover 30 emerging markets between 1984 and 2004.4 We group
privately owned ﬁrms into ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial sectors and split the latter into exporting and
non–exporting sectors using information on the export structure of the country.5 For each sector,
we calculate the total amount that ﬁrms borrowed in the bond market or from bank syndicates
in each month. We also construct a number of indicators that describe various aspects of each
country’s economy as well as factors that aﬀect the world supply of capital to emerging markets,
4Hale (2007) shows that sovereign debt restructuring has a large impact on the instrument composition of private
borrowers’ external debt. Thus, we are combining bond and bank ﬁnancing to account for possible substitution
between the instruments.
5We attempted to split our sample according to an industry’s ﬁnancial dependence (Rajan and Zingales, 1998).
Unfortunately, ﬁnancial dependence data are available only for the manufacturing sector, which will make us lose
more than a half of our sample.
3which we use as control variables. We analyze these data using ﬁxed eﬀects panel regressions.
We ﬁnd systematic evidence of a decline in foreign credit in the aftermath of sovereign debt
crises.6 All the eﬀects are statistically signiﬁcant and economically important: After controlling
for the eﬀects of fundamentals, we ﬁnd an additional decline in credit of over 20% below the
country–speciﬁc average during the debt renegotiations, which persists more than two years after
the restructuring agreement is reached. In our analysis of diﬀerent types of debt restructuring
agreements, we ﬁnd that the decline in foreign credit to the private sector is smaller after agreements
with commercial creditors as opposed to agreements with oﬃcial creditors and that no decline occurs
after voluntary debt swaps and debt buybacks. Furthermore, agreements that include new lending
lead to a lower decline in credit to the private sector than agreements that do not.
The distribution of this decline is uneven across ﬁrms: Credit to the exporting sector is not
aﬀected during the debt renegotiations but declines after the agreement is reached, while credit to
the non–exporting sector declines during the renegotiations and then recovers within a year after
the agreement is reached; credit to the ﬁnancial ﬁrms also declines after the agreement is reached
but by a small amount that is not statistically diﬀerent from zero. Our tentative explanation for
these ﬁndings is an information story in which lenders have diﬀerent amounts of information about
diﬀerent types of borrowers and engage in relationship lending.7
It is worth emphasizing that in focusing on foreign debt ﬁnancing of emerging market pri-
vate ﬁrms, we do not analyze capital ﬂows that occur in the form of trade credit, foreign direct
investment (FDI), or funds raised on the stock market.8 We also exclude multinational and foreign–
owned companies from our sample. Thus, our results are limited to foreign borrowing by private
6In order to capture country risk premium properly, we exclude from the analysis all foreign owned ﬁrms.
7For a similar mechanism discussed in the literature on geographic location of borrowers and lenders, see DeYoung,
Glennon, and Nigro (2006) and references therein.
8Auguste, Dominguez, Kamil, and Tesar (2006) show that after the most recent crisis in Argentina, ﬁrms suc-
cessfully raised funds through ADRs. In a systematic analysis Arslanalp and Henry (2005) ﬁnd that when countries
announce debt relief agreement under Brady Plan, their stock markets experience a sustained appreciation.
4domestically owned ﬁrms.
Our ﬁndings represent a step towards understanding the costs of sovereign debt crises. Recent
models of ﬁnancial crises in general and debt crises in particular assume that debt crises are costly,
particularly in terms of cost of capital (Arellano, 2004; Arellano and Ramanarayanan, 2006; Yue,
2005), but there is very little empirical evidence on the nature of these costs.9 Our paper provides
a justiﬁcation for the assumption of costly debt crises as well as and a set of observations that
might facilitate explicit modeling of such costs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Part 2 we discuss the channels through
which sovereign debt crises can aﬀect private ﬁrms’ foreign borrowing. Part 3 describes the empirical
approach and the data. Part 4 presents the results of the empirical analysis and their relation to
the mechanism of the transmission of debt crisis eﬀects to the private external borrowing. Part 5
concludes.
2 Sovereign debt crises and lending to the private sector
In this section we provide an intuitive discussion of the channels through which sovereign debt crises
can aﬀect foreign credit to domestically owned private ﬁrms. We focus on the short–run eﬀects
and do not discuss structural changes in the economy, such as entry or exit in certain sectors, or
ﬁre–sale FDI activity.
2.1 Causal eﬀects
When the sovereign starts debt renegotiations, whether or not it formally announces its inability to
service the debt, investors might perceive the country risk to be higher and raise the risk premium
9For the empirical work on the cost of capital in emerging markets, see Perri and Neumeyer (2005) and Uribe and
Yue (2006).
5they charge all the borrowers from the country (Drudi and Giordano, 2000). In fact, in many cases
credit rating agencies follow a “sovereign ceiling” practice, according to which no private borrowers
can obtain a better rating than their sovereign. Thus, credit would become more expensive for all
domestic ﬁrms and ﬁrms would decrease their borrowing.10 The size of the decline in credit will
depend on the price elasticity of demand for credit. One would expect that ﬁnancial and exporting
sectors would be more responsive to the changes in the cost of credit: ﬁnancial ﬁrms can rely
on domestic liabilities such as deposits or can reduce their lending, while exporters can ﬁnance
themselves through trade credit.
There is, however, a possibility of an oﬀsetting eﬀect. When a sovereign starts renegotiations
of the debt, it is unlikely to be able to issue any new debt until the deal is settled. During this
time investors might want to lend to the country for diversiﬁcation reasons and thus might actually
increase their supply of credit to the private sector.
After the restructuring agreement is reached, the period of recovery from the debt crisis starts.
Depending on the terms of the agreement, the country risk premium might fall or rise compared
to what it was during the renegotiation period: on the one hand, the uncertainty regarding the
terms of restructuring is resolved, which will always lead to a decline in the risk premium, ceteris
paribus; on the other hand, the terms of the agreement could change investors’ assessment of the
probability of future debt crises and of their losses in case the crisis occurs. If the “haircut” (or
the reduction in the present value of the debt) is too high, investors would expect higher losses
in the future, and if the haircut is too low, they will expect that the sovereign will again have
problems servicing its debt. In either case, the country risk premium might actually go up after
the agreement is reached,11 and the amount of credit will decline even further.
In practice, sovereign debt crises are frequently accompanied by a decline in aggregate demand
10The empirical literature shows that foreign debt restructuring by a sovereign may lead to persistent worsening of
the terms of future borrowing for all ownership sectors (Hale, 2007; Ozler, 1993; Tomz and Wright, 2005).
11See Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2005) and (2006) for a presentation of the history of “haircuts” and other
details of debt restructuring episodes.
6(Dooley and Verma, 2003; Tomz and Wright, 2005). This could be due to a current or expected
monetary and ﬁscal tightening, to the conditionality that IMF involvement in the crisis resolution
usually carries, or to an exogenous shock that leads to both sovereign debt crises and to a decline
in aggregate demand. We discuss the latter possibility in the next section.
Whatever the mechanism, the decline in aggregate demand may lead to a decline in the demand
for goods and services, especially for ﬁrms in the non–exporting sector.12 This decline in demand
will lead to two eﬀects: First, ﬁrms are likely to experience a decline in proﬁts that would lead to a
decline in their net worth, which, in the credit rationing environment, will tighten their borrowing
constraints.13 Second, the ﬁrms are likely to accumulate inventory and produce less next period,
which means they will demand less credit. They will also use fewer inputs, which will push the
price of inputs down and lower the input costs, and therefore further lower their demand for credit.
Sovereign debt crises are frequently accompanied by domestic banking crises, usually because
the government postpones debt restructuring talks and strains the banking system in order to
service the debt until doing so is no longer feasible. This would make domestic liquidity more scarce
and would increase demand for foreign credit both from the banking system and from nonﬁnancial
ﬁrms that ﬁnd it diﬃcult to borrow domestically.14
Some sovereign debt crises are also accompanied by currency collapses. Abstracting from the
long–run eﬀects of these currency collapses, we focus on the accounting eﬀect of large changes
12Since there is no evidence of direct trade sanctions imposed in the aftermath of sovereign defaults (Martinez and
Sandleris, 2004), the decline in demand for the exports is less likely to occur. Rose (2005), on the other hand, ﬁnds
that, in the long run, debt renegotiations do lead to a decline in trade. In addition, as Helpman (2006) points out,
ﬁrms that export only export a small fraction of their output, and, therefore are also likely to be aﬀected by a decline
in domestic aggregate demand.
13Sandleris (2005) derives these eﬀects in a context of endogenous sovereign default. See Stiglitz and Weiss (1981),
Calomiris and Hubbard (1990), and Mason (1998) for models of credit rationing and net worth. See Arellano, Bai,
and Zhang (2006), Mendoza (2006) and Schneider and Tornell (2004) for the models of borrowing constraints in the
context of ﬁnancial crisis.
14For a formal treatment of the interplay between domestic and foreign lending, see Caballero and Krishnamurthy
(2002).
7in the real exchange rates.15 First, if most of the ﬁrms’ costs are denominated in the domestic
currency, they will have to borrow less in foreign currency in order to obtain the same amount in
domestic currency. Since most foreign lending is denominated in “hard” currencies (Eichengreen
and Hausmann, 1999; Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza, 2002), this would mean a decline in
demand for foreign credit. In addition, exporting ﬁrms will experience a decline in their domestic
input costs relative to their foreign sales (which are denominated in foreign currency (Goldberg
and Tille, 2005)). This decline would lead to an increase in their proﬁts and retained earnings and
would allow them to borrow less, i.e., demand less credit. On the other hand, domestic ﬁrms that
use imported intermediate goods will experience an increase in their input costs and will therefore
demand more credit. Finally, ﬁrms with liabilities denominated in foreign currencies that sell in
domestic markets will experience balance sheet eﬀects, which would immediately lead to a decline
in their net worth and tighten their borrowing constraints. Thus, currency depreciation would also
lead to a decline in the supply of credit to non–exporting ﬁrms.
Thus, a sovereign debt crisis can lead to a decline in foreign credit to the private sector through
both a decline in the supply of credit and through a decline in the demand for credit. In this paper,
due to data limitations, we do not attempt to disentangle the demand and the supply eﬀects, but
rather estimate a reduced form model of the eﬀects of sovereign debt crises on the amount of foreign
credit obtained by private sector ﬁrms. However, we try to isolate some of the channels discussed
above by controlling for the state of the economy (through a set of indexes), for the presence of the
IMF agreement, for banking crises, and for changes in real exchange rate.
15Burstein, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2002) and (2004) show that domestic prices adjust very slowly after a currency
collapses, and, therefore, real and nominal exchange rates move closely together in the short run.
82.2 Common shocks
A decline in foreign credit to the private sector could also be due to a shock that simultaneously
triggers a sovereign debt crisis.16 For example, an adverse aggregate demand or productivity shock
would decrease the private sector’s demand for credit, as described above, and at the same time
lead to a decline in government revenues and therefore to a sovereign debt crisis.
Furthermore, both a sovereign debt crisis and a decline in credit to the private sector could
result from a sudden stop in foreign capital inﬂows into the country (Calvo, 1998). In this case,
the decline in credit to the private sector would be due to a decline in the supply of credit to the
country as a whole, rather than to a decline in a demand for credit by individual private ﬁrms.
In both cases, a common shock would create an association between debt renegotiations and
foreign credit to the private sector. It is unlikely, however, that a common shock would lead to the
same simultaneity problem between the restructuring agreement and the foreign credit to private
sector, since the timing of the restructuring agreement depends predominantly on the renegotiation
progress.
Since we are interested in the causal relationship between sovereign debt crises and foreign
credit to private sector, we do our best to control for common shocks in two ways: ﬁrst, including
a set of aggregate demand variables (collected into indexes) and the indicator for systemic sudden
stops (Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi, 2006) as control variables in our ﬁxed eﬀects regressions;17 and,
second, using treatment eﬀects methodology, described in Section 4.4.
16See Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), Arellano (2004), and Yue (2005) for models of sovereign default due to an
exogenous adverse shock. They also show that the same shock leads to a decline in the country’s borrowing, although
they do not distinguish between the private and the public sectors.
17Due to the potential endogeneity of the sudden stop variable, we do not include it in our main speciﬁcation, but
analyze its eﬀect in our robustness tests. The results of the main speciﬁcation are not aﬀected by the addition of the
systemic sudden stop control variable.
93 Empirical approach and data sources
The previous section discussed the channels through which sovereign debt crises might aﬀect private
sector foreign borrowing. We now turn to empirical analysis of this relationship. We look at diﬀerent
measures of credit, as well as various types of debt restructuring agreements.
In order to test for a decline in credit in the aftermath of a sovereign debt restructuring, we
estimate the following reduced–form equation, using regressions with ﬁxed eﬀects:
qit = αi + αt + β0 dit + β1 nit + γ0 rit +
K X
τ=1
γτ zτit + X0
itη + εit, (1)
where qit is a measure of credit, αi is a set of country ﬁxed eﬀects absorbing the eﬀect of initial
conditions, αt is a set of year ﬁxed eﬀects absorbing the eﬀect of common trend, dit is an indicator
of a month in which debt renegotiations start, nit is an indicator of each month during which
renegotiations continue, rit is an indicator of a restructuring agreement month, zτit is an indicator
that a restructuring agreement occurred more than τ−1 but less than τ years ago (we set K = 3),18
Xit is a set of control variables, and εit is a set of robust errors clustered on country. Speciﬁc
deﬁnitions of all these variables are below. Data sources are described in detail in Table 9.
To test whether there is an immediate dampening of the eﬀect after the restructuring agree-
ment, in the above regression we replace z1it’s with the mςit’s which indicate that the restructuring
occurred exactly ς months ago. We include up to 11 months in the regressions, since further eﬀects
are captured by the zτit’s, τ = 2,3. To see if the expectations of debt crisis play a role, we include
up to 12 monthly leads in the regression as well.
18Higher lags are estimated less precisely due to a small number of cases in which the gap between diﬀerent episodes
of renegotiations and restructuring is over 3 years. Setting K = 4 does not aﬀect the results.
103.1 Sovereign debt renegotiations and restructuring episodes: dit,nit,rit
The data on the dates of actual agreements on debt restructuring are readily available from the
Paris Club and the World Bank’s Global Development Finance (2002), which describe all restruc-
turing episodes of commercial and oﬃcial debt that occurred between 1980 and 2000, which we
supplemented with data from subsequent issues of the Global Development Finance. These data
include the terms of restructuring. In addition to negotiated restructuring episodes, the World
Bank data include voluntary debt swaps and debt buybacks, which are also included in our sam-
ple.19 These data also allow us to diﬀerentiate between the agreements that include new loans and
the ones that do not.
The dates of the onset of renegotiations are not readily available. We trace them in the
ﬁnancial news using the Lexis–Nexis database. We search for the ﬁrst mention of the sovereign
debt renegotiation prior to each restructuring episode in any English–language media. The number
of these renegotiation episodes and the number of debt restructuring agreements for the countries
in our sample are reported in Table 1. This table also shows how many of the restructuring
episodes were voluntary debt swaps and buybacks executed at market values, how many episodes
were agreements with commercial creditors, and how many episodes included new lending.20 Note
that the number of renegotiations is substantially smaller than the number of agreements. This
is due to two factors: ﬁrst, some debt has been restructured more than once, and second, some
restructuring episodes such as swaps and buybacks were not preceded by a period of publicly known
renegotiations.
19As such, our deﬁnition of a restructuring episode is much broader than that used in Reinhart, Rogoﬀ, and
Savastano (2003), Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2004), and Tomz and Wright (2005).
20For a detailed description of big sovereign debt crises in the 1990s, see Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006).
113.2 Credit to ﬁnancial, exporting and non–exporting sectors: qit
From Bondware and Loanware data sets, we gather all foreign bond issues and foreign syndicated
loan contracts obtained by emerging market ﬁrms between January 1981 and August 2004.21 Im-
portantly, these do not include trade credit. For bonds issued through oﬀ–shore centers, we trace
the true nationality of the borrower by the location of their headquarters. We exclude all the ﬁrms
that are owned by the government or by multinational or foreign companies.22 For each ﬁrm in
these data sets, we code whether or not it is in the ﬁnancial sector; and, for nonﬁnancials, whether
or not it is in the exporting sector, using the export structure of a country and the borrower’s
industry of activity at a 4-digit SIC level.23 As Helpman (2006) points out, not all the ﬁrms in
the exporting sector will export, suggesting that our method of coding ﬁrms into exporting and
non–exporting is imprecise. Given the available data, however, this was the best we could do. If
we miscode non–exporters as exporters (the error is unlikely to go the other way), we would be less
likely to ﬁnd the diﬀerence between the two sectors downward. We also believe that the ﬁrms that
have direct access to foreign capital markets tend to be larger and more proﬁtable and therefore
are more likely to export.
We then aggregate the amounts (measured in U.S. dollars) of bond issues and of loans for each
sector–country–month. We drop from our analysis countries for which the total amount of bonds
and loans for all three sectors was non–zero in fewer than 24 months out of 264 months in our data
sample. This ensures that we have enough identifying observations for each country, and leaves us
with the 30 countries listed in Table 1. Figure 1 and Table 2 summarize the amount borrowed by
each sector in our sample.
21Bond data start in March 1991.
22Desai, Foley, and Forbes (2004) ﬁnd that multinationals expand their activities and credit as a result of currency
depreciation.
23The export structure is obtained from (Feenstra, Romalis, and Schott, 2002). Table 4 presents sample industries
in exporting and non–exporting sectors. Some industries appear in both columns, because they represent exports for
some countries, but not for the others.
12We divide each amount by the U.S. consumer price index (CPI) to obtain the amount of credit
for each sector–country–month in real dollars. We then construct our dependent variables as a
percentage deviation from the country–speciﬁc average for each of the sectors.24 Due to the high
frequency of debt crises in some countries, we do not exclude crisis periods from our means, which
biases the means downwards; therefore, the eﬀects we ﬁnd may be smaller than the true ones.
3.3 Control variables: Xit
The control variables are indexes that describe diﬀerent dimensions of the economy.25 In each case,
the variables are used as percentage deviation from their 25-year country–speciﬁc average from
1980 to 2004 on a monthly basis. All the indexes described below, with the exception of global
supply of capital indexes, are lagged by one month.26
Since many of the variables we would like to control for are highly correlated, we construct
the indexes using the method of principal components. Because a principal component is a linear
combination of the variables that enter it, in cases when some variables are missing, other weights
can be re-scaled to compensate for missing variables. In this way, some of the gaps in the data may
be ﬁlled, which in our case is a main advantage of using these indexes.
We group the variables in the following categories, summarized in Table 3. The linear combi-
nations are reported in the Appendix.
• International competitiveness. A country’s international competitiveness aﬀects the prof-
24We use percentage deviations from the country–speciﬁc sample means for all continuous variables. Diﬀerences
in means are captured by country ﬁxed eﬀects, while common trends are captured by year ﬁxed eﬀects. We do not
exclude country–speciﬁc trends in variables because the measured trends are aﬀected by sovereign debt crises and
excluding them will mask the debt crises eﬀects.
25We draw on the broad empirical literature on emerging market spreads to select our variables (Eichengreen, Hale,
and Mody, 2001; Eichengreen and Mody, 2000a; Eichengreen and Mody, 2000b; Gelos, Sahay, and Sandleris, 2004;
Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart, 1998; Mody, Taylor, and Kim, 2001).
26This turns out not to make much diﬀerence in our estimates compared to the case when they are not lagged or
when they are lagged one year. The main reason we lag the indicators is because ﬂow variables entering the indexes
are calculated for the entire month, while the negotiations could have started towards the beginning of the month.
13itability of ﬁrms in both the export and the import substitution sectors and therefore their
demand for credit. It also reﬂects a country’s ability to bring in enough foreign currency
to service its foreign debt and thus will aﬀect foreign investors’ interest in the country. The
following variables are used to construct the index: terms of trade, change in current account,
index of the market prices of the country’s export commodities,27 change in real exchange
rate, and volatility of export revenues. This index is scaled by a measure of trade openness —
the ratio of trade volume (sum of exports and imports) to GDP. Two principal components
are retained for this index.
• Investment climate and monetary stability. This index accounts for the short–run
macroeconomic situation in the country. It reﬂects demand for investment, the availability of
domestic funds, and foreign investors’ interest in the country. This index is constructed using
the following variables: sovereign credit risk, measured by the Institutional Investor credit
rating, ratio of debt service to exports, ratio of investment to GDP, real interest rate, ratio of
lending interest rate to deposit interest rate, inﬂation rate, ratio of domestic credit to GDP,
and change in domestic stock market index. Three principal components are retained for this
index.
• Financial development. The level of development of the ﬁnancial market aﬀects domestic
funding opportunities for ﬁrms and, therefore, their demand for foreign credit, and their
ability to service foreign debt. This index is based on the ratio of stock market capitalization
to GDP, the ratio of commercial bank assets to GDP, and the degree of ﬁnancial account
openness, which reﬂects how easy it is for ﬁrms to access foreign capital directly. Only the
27Many emerging markets rely heavily on the export of a small number of commodities. We identify up to ﬁve of
these commodities (or commodity groups) for each country and merge these data with monthly commodity prices
from the Global Financial Data and the International Financial Statistics. For each commodity, we calculate monthly
percentage deviations from its 25-year average (1980-2004). For each country and each month, we construct the index
as a simple average of relevant deviations of commodity prices. If a country is exporting a variety of manufactured
goods and does not rely on commodity exports, this index is set to zero.
14ﬁrst principal component is retained for this index.28
• Long–run macroeconomic prospects. The economy’s growth prospects aﬀect the invest-
ment demand of ﬁrms and the investors assessment of the country risk. This index is based
on the ratio of total foreign debt to GDP, the growth rate of real GDP, the growth rate of
nominal GDP measured in U.S. dollars, and the unemployment rate. The ﬁrst two principal
components are used.
• Political stability. When the political situation in a country is unstable, it introduces uncer-
tainty and leads to a decline in ﬁrms’ investment and their demand for credit; furthermore, it
may lead to foreign investors’ concerns about their ability to collect their assets in the future.
This index is adopted directly from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).
• Global supply of capital. This index reﬂects the availability of capital in general, changes
in investors’ risk attitude, and their willingness to provide capital to emerging markets. This
index is constructed on the basis of an investor conﬁdence index,29 the growth rate of the U.S.
stock market index, the U.S. Treasury rate, the volume of gross international capital outﬂows
from OECD countries, and Merrill Lynch High Yield Spreads. All variables are presented
as percentage deviations from their 25–year average. Two principal components are retained
and capture 65% of the variance.
In addition to these indexes, we include explicitly the real exchange rate, because it can aﬀect
the amount of borrowing measured in foreign currency directly, through the accounting eﬀects
described above.30 To control for the eﬀects of banking crises that sometimes accompany sovereign
debt crises, we include an annual banking crisis indicator (Hutchison and Noy, 2005).
28Chinn and Ito (forthcoming) show that, in fact, ﬁnancial openness and ﬁnancial development tend to be correlated.
29Yale School of Management Stock Market Conﬁdence Indexes can be obtained from the Yale SOM web site.
30Nominal exchange rates were obtained from various data sources. For countries that changed the denomination
of their currency, continuous series were constructed to reﬂect true changes in currency values.
15Some creditors are not able or willing to lend to the countries that do not have an IMF
agreement in place, therefore, supply of credit to these countries can be adversely aﬀected, especially
in the aftermath of sovereign debt crisis. We set this variable equal to one if either a standby or
an extended funds facility is in place for each month for a given country. Since the IMF funding
is extended to sovereigns, they might aﬀect sovereign demand for funds from commercial creditors,
but are not likely to aﬀect private demand for foreign credit directly .
4 Empirical ﬁndings
We analyze whether there is a reduction in credit due to sovereign debt crises. We ﬁrst focus on
the medium run, including our main explanatory variable for up to three years. We then repeat
the analysis with monthly indicators of the event.
The size of the coeﬃcients in all regressions can be easily interpreted. The “impact” coeﬃcient
represents the size of the percentage change in credit relative to what it would have been without
the renegotiations or restructuring agreement in a given month. The coeﬃcients on the annual
indicators represent the size of the percentage change in credit in each month of the year τ since
the debt restructuring agreement, assuming this change was constant throughout the year, relative
to what it would have been otherwise.
4.1 Main results
The results for the most broadly deﬁned debt restructuring episodes and for the total borrowing by
all sectors are presented in Table 5. The ﬁrst column presents a regression that does not include any
variables associated with sovereign debt crises and is just the test of our speciﬁcation with respect
to control variables. All the regressions in the table include year and country ﬁxed eﬀects. We can
see that with the ﬁxed eﬀects included, the ﬁrst two groups of indexes do not have a signiﬁcant
16eﬀect. Overall, our model explains 20% of the variance in the ﬂuctuations of private borrowing.31
All subsequent regressions include our variables of interest. The second column presents a
regression with only debt renegotiations and restructuring variables on the right–hand side. We
can see that the credit declines immediately in the month the renegotiations begin, although this
coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant, then falls further during the renegotiations, by about 30%, and even
further, by an additional 14% in the ﬁrst year after the restructuring agreement is reached. It
recovers a third of the way in the second year and another third in the third year.
Column (3) adds our control variables, or “fundamentals.” We can see that part of the decline
in credit found in column (2) is due to worsening of the fundamentals — the decline in credit
during debt renegotiations is just below 20%, which worsens to a 30% decline after the agreement
is reached. The recovery pattern appears to be slower when we control for the fundamentals.
Figure 2 presents the coeﬃcients, based on the model in column (3), on the sovereign debt rene-
gotiations and restructuring variables that are included at monthly frequency with their individual
conﬁdence intervals. The F-tests below measure the probability that the sum of the coeﬃcients is
zero for each time period: before the crisis, during the period of renegotiations (between “talks”
and “deal”), and after the restructuring agreement. We include 12 lead months (months before
the start of debt renegotiations) in order to see if the debt crises were expected. We include up
to 24 months of renegotiations (only 12 are represented on the graph), and 12 months with two
additional annual dummies for the time after the agreement is reached.32
We ﬁnd that there is no eﬀect of the “expected” debt crises: credit prior to the start of debt
31This is a rather large share given that our left–hand side is measured in percentage deviations from the country–
speciﬁc means
32The picture represents an example of a timeline for the case when the renegotiations take exactly a year. In the
cases when the renegotiations do not last as long, the “deal” line has to be moved to the left. If the renegotiations
take longer, the line has to be moved to the right. Only 12 month are included because there are very few cases for
which renegotiations take longer and therefore the conﬁdence intervals are very large. The F-test is based on all 12
monthly coeﬃcients and a dummy for the second year of renegotiations.
17renegotiations is actually higher than the mean.33 This positive eﬀect could be due to excessive
capital inﬂows into a country prior to sovereign debt crises (Arellano, 2004; Yue, 2005), as was the
case in Mexico in 1994; or it could be simply due to the fact that crisis times are included in the
means and therefore credit during “normal” times is higher than the mean by construction. We
also see that there are no signs of recovering credit both during the renegotiations and for two years
after the agreement is reached.
Even though our dependent variable is measured as a percentage deviation from the country
mean, we are concerned that it might be persistent. In column (4) we allow for the AR(1) dis-
turbance in the coeﬃcients and ﬁnd, reassuringly, that our point estimates and their signiﬁcance
levels are hardly aﬀected by that change and that the estimated AR(1) coeﬃcient is rather small at
0.08. We pursue this test further by including a lagged dependent variable on the right–hand side
in column (5), and a country–speciﬁc lagged dependent variable in column (6). While we observe
slight diﬀerences in the estimated coeﬃcients, they are all within the same conﬁdence interval as
in our main speciﬁcation (column (3)). This is not surprising, since the coeﬃcients on the lagged
dependent variable are small. In what follows, we will use the speciﬁcation in column (3), which
corresponds to equation (1), for our additional tests.
Before turning to more reﬁned tests, we would like to summarize the insights we obtain from
this estimation:
• In the aftermath of debt crises, the private sector experiences a 30-40% decline in foreign
credit that persists for over two years.
• About a third of this decline is due to worsening fundamentals, banking system distress,
currency depreciation, or the combination of these factors.
33As shown by the F-statistic, the sum of the monthly coeﬃcient 12 months prior to the beginning of debt renegoti-
ations is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at 8.4% level. When estimating the regression that restricts these coeﬃcients
to be the same, a year–lead indicator, we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient is equal to 14.8 with P-value of the t-test 8.6%.
Other coeﬃcients in our baseline regression, Table 5 column (3), remain almost unchanged when we add this year–lead
variable.
18• Controlling for fundamentals, banking crises, and the real exchange rate, the estimated decline
in foreign credit to the private sector is about 20% during debt renegotiations, which increases
to 30% in the ﬁrst year after the agreement is reached, and is still around 20% in the third
year after the debt restructuring agreement.
4.2 Diﬀerent sectors
Table 6 and Figure 3 present the results of the reduced form estimation, where the left–hand side
variable represents the total amount borrowed by a given sector of the economy. The sample and
the speciﬁcation is the same as in column (3) of Table 5 and equation (1). The dependent variable
is now the borrowing by a particular sector of the economy rather than by all private ﬁrms.34
We ﬁnd that the eﬀects of sovereign debt crises are not the same for all the sectors of the
economy. Column (1) presents the results of our estimation for the ﬁnancial sector — none of the
debt crisis coeﬃcients are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. This result is not surprising given that
we control for the banking crises and the real exchange rate. Conditional on the fundamentals,
foreign investors would like to maintain their relationship with banks and other ﬁnancial institutions
even if the sovereigns have defaulted on their debt.
Column (2) presents the results for the entire nonﬁnancial sector. Since the entire private
sector that we analyzed in Table 5 consists of only ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial ﬁrms, the eﬀect that
we ﬁnd for the entire economy has to show up in the nonﬁnancial sector, since the ﬁnancial sector
appears to be unaﬀected. Indeed, we ﬁnd that the decline in credit to nonﬁnancial ﬁrms is about
the same order of magnitude as for the whole economy, both during the renegotiations and after
the restructuring agreement is reached.
Columns (3) and (4) split nonﬁnancial ﬁrms into those that are in the exporting sector, and
those that are in the domestic (non–exporting) sector. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that the decline
34The number of observations varies slightly because not all sectors are equally represented in all countries.
19in credit to the nonﬁnancial sector during debt renegotiations is only due to a decline in the
non–exporting sector. On the other hand, the decline in the aftermath of the debt restructuring
agreement is entirely concentrated in the exporting sector.
It is relatively easy to make sense of the pattern we ﬁnd for the non–exporting sector. Sovereign
debt crisis increases uncertainty and tends to lower aggregate demand, thus negatively aﬀecting
both demand for credit by non–exporting ﬁrms and the supply of credit to them, as we discussed
above. When the agreement is reached, the uncertainty is resolved and the aggregate output is
likely to start recovering, restoring both demand and supply of credit for the non–exporting sector.
It is harder to understand the results we ﬁnd for exporters. One potential explanation is
that foreign lenders view exporters as more valued customers than the non–exporting sector. This
could be because foreign banks tend to also have trade credit relationships with exporters and
that exporters are able to supply some, albeit costly, collateral in the form of their international
shipments. Thus, there is an option value to the banks for waiting until the uncertainty is resolved,
which would explain the lack of decline in credit to exporters during the period of renegotiations.
The decline in credit to exporters after the agreement is reached could imply that investors on
average are not satisﬁed with the terms of the agreement and decrease their overall lending to the
country.
We can summarize our ﬁndings in this section as follows:
• The decline in credit to the private sector in the aftermath of sovereign debt crises is entirely
concentrated in the nonﬁnancial sector.
• Among nonﬁnancial ﬁrms, the ﬁrms that are in the non–exporting sector experience a decline
of about 12% in credit during debt renegotiations, while exporters are not aﬀected during
this period.
• In the aftermath of the restructuring agreement, credit to non–exporting ﬁrms fully recovers,
20while credit to exporters declines by about 20% and stays at this low level for over two years.
4.3 Types of debt restructuring
In the above analysis we deﬁne debt restructuring quite broadly, including many varieties of debt
reduction. It is reasonable to believe that voluntary debt swaps and debt buybacks by the gov-
ernment would not have the same eﬀect as other forms of debt restructuring that involve maturity
extension or a reduction in principal or interest payments. The agreements may aﬀect investors’
behavior diﬀerently depending on whether or not they include new credit. Finally, commercial and
oﬃcial debt restructuring may have diﬀerent eﬀects. We therefore estimate our model separately
for diﬀerent types of debt restructuring, for the entire private sector of the country. Again, we em-
ploy the same speciﬁcation as in column (3) of Table 5 and equation (1). The results are reported
in Table 7.
In column (1), we include, in the same regression equation, separately the eﬀects of buybacks
and swaps and the eﬀects of debt restructuring episodes that exclude buybacks and swaps (see
column (3) of Table 1 for the number of buybacks and swaps for each country). We can see that
our main results are driven by the debt restructuring agreements that do not include voluntary
swaps and buybacks. Voluntary buybacks and swaps appear to be benign, if not beneﬁcial: there
is an increase in credit, although it is not statistically signiﬁcant.
In column (2), we separate debt restructuring episodes into those that included new money
(new credit), and those that did not (see column (5) of Table 1 for the number of the agreements
that included new money, by country). Agreements that include new money have a smaller eﬀect
on private sector foreign borrowing. Possibly, the agreements that do not carry with them new
loans contain a worse signal about a country’s future creditworthiness and increase the country
risk premium to a larger extent. In addition, this ﬁnding is consistent with the hypothesis dis-
cussed above that when no new credit accompanies debt restructuring, the economy might remain
21depressed for a longer period of time.
In column (3), we separate the eﬀects of the agreements with commercial creditors from the
eﬀects of the agreements with oﬃcial creditors (see column (4) of Table 1 for the number of com-
mercial agreements by country). We ﬁnd that oﬃcial debt restructuring leads to a larger decline in
credit than commercial agreements. A potential explanation for this result could lie in the timing
of debt renegotiations — as a rule, oﬃcial creditors negotiate with sovereigns before commercial
creditors; thus, the agreement with commercial creditors contains no new information, especially if
it just mimics the terms of the oﬃcial agreement.
In a related paper, Arslanalp and Henry (2005) ﬁnd that when countries announced debt relief
agreement under the Brady Plan, they experience a stock market appreciation which successfully
forecasted higher future resource transfer. Inasmuch as Brady deals were deals with commercial
creditors and included both new money and buybacks of past debt, our results would predict that
Brady deals would not lead to as much decline in credit to private sector as other debt restructuring
agreements.
We can test for the eﬀects of Brady deals explicitly, although there are only eight Brady deals
in our sample.35 Estimating a regression analogous to those reported in columns (1)-(3) of Table 7,
with debt restructuring agreements separated into Brady and non-Brady, we ﬁnd that the decline
in credit in the ﬁrst two years after Brady deals is 13-15% and is not statistically diﬀerent from
zero. We do ﬁnd an increase of 25% in the third year after the agreement, but it is not statistically
diﬀerent from zero, either. Small number of Brady-type agreements is most likely responsible for the
low precision of our estimates. Therefore, we ﬁnd no contradiction between our results and those
of Arslanalp and Henry (2005), although our methodology and sample are not powerful enough to
conﬁrm their results with certainty.36
35See Table 10.
36We must point out important diﬀerences between our paper and Arslanalp and Henry (2005): Our samples only
intersect on seven Brady deals; We use the dates of ﬁnal agreement, from the World Bank, while Arslanalp and Henry
(2005) use the dates of agreement in principle, from the news sources; Arslanalp and Henry (2005) ﬁnd no persistent
22In the last column, we analyze the eﬀects of the agreements that are harmful by all three
criteria: agreements with oﬃcial creditors that do not include new money and are not voluntary
swaps or buybacks (only 41 out of 155 agreements enter this estimation). Our goal here is to get
an idea of the quantitative decline in credit after the “worst–case scenario” episodes. We ﬁnd a
decline in credit of over 40% that persists for as long as three years.
Thus, we ﬁnd that countries that reschedule their oﬃcial debt and do not receive new loans as
a part of a debt restructuring agreement experience a larger decline in private external borrowing
than the countries that reschedule their commercial debt, rely on buybacks and swaps and receive
new loans as part of their restructuring agreement.37
4.4 Common shocks and reverse causality
As we discussed above, there is a possibility that the decline in foreign credit to private sector
and sovereign debt crises are due to the same external shock and therefore the relationship we ﬁnd
above is not causal. We control for some of the potential common shocks (such as a decline in
aggregate demand) in all our regressions through the use of the indexes.
Calvo (1998) argues that capital ﬂows to a country could dry up for reasons not completely
in control of the country. Such “sudden stops” would not necessarily occur in all countries, and
therefore would not be captured by our measure of the global supply of capital. Thus, we include an
indicator that is equal to one in each month a given country was aﬀected by a systemic sudden stop
in capital inﬂows, according to Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2006). Since this variable is missing
for many countries, we do not include it in the main speciﬁcation. Its addition does not aﬀect the
results of our estimation.
gains from Brady deals in the countries that do not stick to reforms, suggesting that it is a combination of reforms
and Brady deals that is beneﬁcial, while we condition on economic performance, removing its eﬀect, which would
lower positive estimated eﬀects of Brady deals.
37Here and in all the regressions we control for country ﬁxed eﬀects.
23In addition, we apply treatment eﬀects methodology to separate the causal relationship from
common shocks (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; Angrist and Krueger, 1999). We do this in two steps:
ﬁrst, we construct the propensity score using probit regression of the on–set of renegotiations on
the real GDP growth rate, sudden stop indicator and two indexes describing the global supply of
capital.38 The propensity score is then equal to the predicted probability of sovereign debt crisis.
We next compare the amount of foreign credit to private sector for the observations with similar
propensity score but diﬀerent outcomes: the treatment group is the set of country-months that are in
the process of debt renegotiations, the control group is the rest of observations, excluding the month
of the beginning of renegotiations. We use, alternatively, stratiﬁed and kernel matching techniques.
In all speciﬁcations we ﬁnd that foreign credit to private sector is lower by 16-22%, depending
on speciﬁcation, during the period of debt renegotiations. These estimates are all statistically
signiﬁcant at 1% conﬁdence level.
We do not believe that the explicit reverse causality drives the results. Intuitively, it is unlikely
that changes in the amount ﬁrms borrow internationally cause sovereign debt crisis. Statistically,
in any speciﬁcation we attempted, lagged values of the percentage change in the foreign credit to
private sector do not have an eﬀect on the probability of the on–set of debt renegotiations.39
4.5 Robustness tests
In this section we describe the robustness tests that we conducted. Table 8 presents some of the
results. The rest of the results are not reported — they are available from the authors upon request.
In some cases, after ﬁnancial crisis, the FDI activity increases, thus making the set of domestic
ﬁrms smaller. Since we only include domestically owned ﬁrms in the analysis, we are concerned
38Our results do not depend on whether or not we us country and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
39We estimated probit and linear probability models with and without controls and with and without ﬁxed eﬀects
for countries and years. We included up to three lags for the amount borrowed. The P-values for the coeﬃcients on
the lag amount borrowed range from 0.56 to 0.96.
24that the total amount of credit would go down simply because there are fewer domestic ﬁrms.
To address this issue, in columns (1) and (2) instead of using the total amount borrowed on the
left–hand side, we analyze separately the changes in average size of a loan or a bond issue and
the changes in the total number of loans or bond issues.40 We ﬁnd that both the average amount
(measured in U.S. dollars) and the frequency of borrowing fall substantially after sovereign debt
crisis. This suggests that our results are not coming purely from the composition eﬀect, in which
case we would not observe the decline in the average size of the debt issue.
In order to see whether the accounting eﬀects of currency depreciation are important and are
not properly controlled for by including the real exchange rate, we analyze the total amount of
credit measured instead in national currency units. The results are reported in column (3). We
ﬁnd that the results are very similar to those with credit measured in U.S. dollars (the appropriate
comparison is Table 5 column (5)), although the coeﬃcients are slightly smaller.41
To see if the eﬀects are driven by the Russia–LTCM eﬀects (Calvo and Talvi, 2005), we end
our sample in 1998 (column (4)). We ﬁnd that, although coeﬃcients are slightly smaller than for
the full sample, they are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. We lose signiﬁcance for years 2 and 3 after the
restructuring agreement since we lose the eﬀects of restructuring episodes that occurred after 1995
— 50 out of 155 restructuring episodes in our sample.
To see whether the eﬀects are diﬀerent for diﬀerent credit markets, we split the amounts
borrowed by bonds and loans. We ﬁnd that our results are driven entirely by the loan market, not
surprising given the composition of private debt presented in Figure 1 and in Table 2. We decided
to keep bonds in our future regressions in order to account for possible substitution eﬀects between
the two instruments.
40We conduct this analysis for the nonﬁnancial sector only, since there is no observed decline in credit to the
ﬁnancial sector.
41In this regression we do not include the real exchange rate on the right–hand side, because we use the nominal
exchange rate to calculate the amount borrowed denominated in national currency, since actual borrowing occurs in
foreign currency.
25Since the results are driven by loans, we were worried that the debt crisis of the 1980s would
have a disproportionate eﬀect, since loans were the only credit instrument at that time. We ﬁnd that
this is not the case: When we limit our sample to the 1980s (column (5)), we ﬁnd a decline in private
credit only at the onset of debt renegotiations and no signiﬁcant eﬀects of debt restructuring. We
think this is mostly due to the fact that foreign credit to the private sector was much less important
during the 1980s (see Table 2). In fact, our results are driven mostly by the 1990s: when we re–
estimate our model for the sample that starts in 1991, when the bond market began to expand
(column (6)), we ﬁnd that the eﬀects are slightly larger, but not statistically diﬀerent from the full
sample results.
Even though we include year dummies and control for the export commodity price index, we
were worried that our results for exporters might be aﬀected by the ﬁrms exporting oil and oil–
related products. We exclude all oil industry ﬁrms from our calculations of the amount borrowed
and ﬁnd that the decline in credit for exporters is less persistent, but otherwise the picture remains
unchanged.
To examine whether the eﬀects are driven by “serial defaulters,” we excluded Argentina, Brazil,
Mexico, Poland, and Russia from our sample.42 We ﬁnd that our results continue to hold. When we
instead limit our sample to these ﬁve countries, we ﬁnd that the picture is still the same, although
the coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcant for the most part. To see whether our results are driven by Latin
America, we exclude all Latin American countries from the sample and ﬁnd that the results are
qualitatively the same.
We changed the content of the indexes in various ways. The results do not seem to be sensitive
to these changes. We estimated the model with contemporaneous indexes rather than lagging them
one month and found no signiﬁcant changes. We also estimated the model with indexes 1-5 lagged
one year and found no signiﬁcant changes in our results.
42We also experimented with excluding other countries, and found that no single country is driving our results.
26Finally, to test whether the heterogeneity of the data is driving the results, we estimated our
model separately for each country and then averaged the estimated coeﬃcients for each variable.
All of the coeﬃcients of interest are within the same conﬁdence interval as in the main speciﬁcation.
5 Concluding remarks
We empirically conﬁrm that, during debt renegotiations and in the aftermath of restructuring
agreements, foreign credit to emerging market private ﬁrms declines by over 20%. We ﬁnd that
the negative impact of debt renegotiations and debt restructuring agreements varies by the type
of borrower and is concentrated in nonﬁnancial sector. We ﬁnd the diﬀerences in the response of
credit to exporters and to non–exporting sector unexpected and intriguing, and believe they deserve
theoretical investigation.
In addition to simply documenting the decline in private external borrowing in the aftermath
of sovereign debt crises, this paper makes further empirical contributions by analyzing the eﬀects
of diﬀerent types of debt restructuring and looking at diﬀerent types of borrowers. In that, our
ﬁndings not only provide justiﬁcation for the assumption of costly sovereign debt crises frequently
made in the literature, but also suggest some nuanced features an explicit model of such costs
should have. In particular, our ﬁndings point to the importance of information and uncertainty
associated with sovereign debt crises.
Our ﬁndings suggest that taking into account the impact of sovereign debt crises on domestic
ﬁrms is important: not only because of the direct costs associated with decline in foreign credit
and therefore production in the economy, but also because such decline in credit can hamper future
economic growth and therefore make subsequent debt crises more likely. However, bailing–out the
sovereigns would not be a cure: even in cases when actual default was formally prevented through
multilateral renegotiations, credit to the private sector declined before and after the agreement was
27reached. On the other hand, using voluntary forms of debt reduction did not lead to such adverse
eﬀects on credit to the private sector (these are usually not preceded by lengthy renegotiations).
It is important to note that we only focus on foreign credit provided to private ﬁrms. Moreover,
our sample only includes ﬁrms that have direct access to foreign capital — ﬁrms that tend to be
large. If their access to foreign capital is impaired, they are likely to turn to domestic banks, thus
crowding out the credit to smaller ﬁrms. Thus, even though we do not consider small ﬁrms in our
analysis, our results are suggestive of a decline in total credit in the economy and may partially
explain the decline in economic activity observed after sovereign debt crises.
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32Appendix: Data formats and sources
[Insert Tables 9 and 10 about here]
Indexes
The indexes were constructed using the full sample with weights zero assigned to missing vari-
ables. Here we present the linear combinations of the variables that are our indexes. All the
variables enter as their percentage deviations from the country–speciﬁc means in a standardized
form, which renders them unit–free and comparable.
Index 1.1 = (0.63 ∗ TOT + 0.024 ∗ ˙ CA − 0.071 ∗ ˙ RER − 0.68 ∗ EPI + 0.35 ∗ V OLT) ∗ TO,
Index 1.2 = (0.24 ∗ TOT + 0.81 ∗ ˙ CA + 0.49 ∗ ˙ RER + 0.0010 ∗ EPI − 0.20 ∗ V OLT) ∗ TO,
where
TOT Terms of Trade Up = Improvement
˙ CA Change in CA Up = Improvement
˙ RER Change in Real Exchange Rate Up = Appreciation
EPI Export Price Index Up = Increase
V OLT Trade Volatility Up = Increase
TO Trade Openness (EX+IM)/GDP Up = Increase
Index 2.1 = 0.033 ∗ SCR + 0.053 ∗ DS/EX − 0.67 ∗ I/Y + 0.19 ∗ RIR
−0.16 ∗ LR/DR − 0.045 ∗ INFL + 0.70 ∗ DC/Y + 0.0015 ∗ ˙ SI
Index 2.2 = 0.57 ∗ SCR − 0.12 ∗ DS/EX + 0.05 ∗ I/Y + 0.31 ∗ RIR
−0.39 ∗ LR/DR + 0.63 ∗ INFL − 0.010 ∗ DC/Y − 0.0076 ∗ ˙ SI
Index 2.3 = 0.25 ∗ SCR + 0.81 ∗ DS/EX + 0.21 ∗ I/Y + 0.37 ∗ RIR
−0.041 ∗ LR/DR − 0.29 ∗ INFL − 0.0007 ∗ DC/Y + 0.039 ∗ ˙ SI
where
SCR Sovereign Credit Risk Up = Lower risk
DS/EX Debt Service/Exports Up = Increase
I/Y Investment/GDP Up = Increase
RIR Real Interest Rate Up = Increase
LR/DR Lending Rate/Deposit Rate Up = Increase
INFL Inﬂation Rate Up = Increase
DC/Y Domestic Credit/GDP Up = Increase
˙ SI Change in Stock Market Index Up = Increase
33Index 3.1 = 0.60 ∗ OPEN + 0.55 ∗ BA + 0.58 ∗ SM
where
OPEN Financial Account Openness Up = More open
BA Commercial Bank Assets/GDP Up = Increase
SM Stock Market Capitalization/GDP Up = Increase
Index 4.1 = 0.40 ∗ FD/Y + 0.61 ∗ ˆ Y − 0.50 ∗ ˆ PY + 0.46 ∗ U,
Index 4.2 = 0.59 ∗ FD/Y − 0.28 ∗ ˆ Y + 0.57 ∗ ˆ PY + 0.49 ∗ U,
where
FD/Y Foreign Debt/GDP UP = Increase
ˆ Y Growth Rate of Real GDP Up = Increase
ˆ PY Growth Rate of GDP in US Dollars Up = Increase
U Unemployment Rate Up = Increase
Index 5.1 = ICRG Political Stability Index.
Finally,
Index 6.1 = −0.60 ∗ CO + 0.34 ∗ CI + 0.39 ∗ TR + 0.59 ∗ HY + 0.16 ∗ ˆ USSI,
Index 6.2 = 0.37 ∗ CO + 0.62 ∗ CI + 0.55 ∗ TR − 0.38 ∗ HY + 0.18 ∗ ˆ USSI,
where
CO Gross Capital Outﬂows from OECD Up = Increase
CI Investor Conﬁdence Index Up = More conﬁdence
TR U.S. Treasury Rate Up = Increase
HY ML High Yield Spread Up = Increase
ˆ USSI Growth Rate of U.S. Stock Market Index Up = Increase
34Figure 1: Composition of new foreign borrowing by private domestically owned ﬁrms in the sample Composition of foreign borrowing by  private 





























































Note: ﬁn = ﬁnancial sector, ex = non–ﬁnancial exporting sector, n/ex = non–ﬁnancial non–exporting sector
































































Prob > F = 0.084 Prob > F = 0.044 Prob > F = 0.002
Note: Each point on the solid line represents a β–coeﬃcient on the appropriate lead or lag in
the regression where the dependent variable is the percentage deviations of the amount borrowed.
Dashed lines represent a 95% conﬁdence interval fr each β–coeﬃcient. “talks” indicates the month
during which debt renegotiations started, “deal” indicates the month in which the debt restructuring
agreement was reached. “Prob > F” indicates the P-values for the test of the hypothesis that the
sum of the coeﬃcients in the relevant range is diﬀerent from zero.
























































































































































































































































Prob > F = 0.836 Prob > F = 0.559 Prob > F = 0.058
Note: See notes for Figure 2.
37Table 1: Number of renegotiations and restructuring episodes by country
Country Years in sample Negotiationsa All Swaps and Commercial Include
resched.a buybacksa resched.a New moneya
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Algeria 1984-2001 2 4 0 2 0
Argentina 1985-2003 5 19 10 14 4
Bahrain 1984-2001 0 0 0 0 0
Brazil 1990-2003 4 17 7 13 3
Chile 1984-2004 4 10 1 8 4
China 1994-2003 0 0 0 0 0
Colombia 1984-2004 4 4 4 4 2
Croatia 1999-2004 1 1 0 0 0
Egypt 1984-2001 2 2 0 0 0
Ghana 1984-2001 0 2 0 0 0
Hong Kong 1990-2003 0 0 0 0 0
Hungary 1984-2004 0 0 0 0 0
India 1988-2001 0 0 0 0 0
Indonesia 1984-2003 1 3 0 1 0
Korea 1985-2003 1 1 0 0 0
Malaysia 1984-2004 0 0 0 0 0
Mexico 1984-2002 3 26 15 23 4
Pakistan 1984-2002 3 4 0 0 0
Peru 1988-2003 4 6 0 2 1
Philippines 1984-2004 6 11 4 6 3
Poland 1990-2004 8 15 1 9 0
Romania 1991-2002 3 6 0 4 0
Russia 1994-2002 3 10 0 0 0
Saudi Arabia 1984-2002 0 0 0 0 0
Singapore 1984-2002 0 0 0 0 0
Slovakia 1993-2004 0 0 0 0 0
South Africa 1984-2004 2 5 0 5 0
Thailand 1984-2003 0 0 0 0 0
Turkey 1984-2003 1 2 1 2 0
Venezuela 1984-2002 5 7 2 7 2
Total 60 155 45 100 23
aNumber of renegotiations and restructuring in 1980-2002.
38Table 2: New borrowing by emerging markets’ private domestically owned ﬁrms in the sample
Year Total Loans Bonds
Total Fin. Nonﬁnancial Total Fin. Nonﬁnancial
Total Exp. Not exp. Total Exp. Non–exp.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
1981 29.2 29.2 10.7 18.5 11.0 7.6
1982 26.6 26.6 8.6 18.1 10.3 7.7
1983 16.1 16.1 5.8 10.3 7.8 2.5
1984 19.6 19.6 7.4 12.2 8.3 4.0
1985 19.4 19.4 13.2 6.2 3.2 3.1
1986 17.2 17.2 11.7 5.4 3.2 2.3
1987 14.4 14.4 8.7 5.7 2.6 3.0
1988 13.3 13.3 4.8 8.5 4.6 3.9
1989 22.6 22.6 5.6 16.9 10.9 6.0
1990 29.4 29.4 7.8 21.6 13.2 8.4
1991 44.0 39.8 12.5 27.3 15.7 11.6 4.2 1.6 2.6 2.0 0.6
1992 51.7 41.4 11.8 29.6 19.5 10.1 10.3 6.5 3.8 3.1 0.7
1993 64.8 45.7 11.6 34.1 17.8 16.3 19.1 10.2 9.0 7.1 1.8
1994 83.8 66.2 17.9 48.3 27.4 20.9 17.6 8.7 8.9 5.0 3.9
1995 111.2 98.7 31.4 67.3 36.5 30.8 12.5 6.2 6.2 4.0 2.2
1996 147.3 123.1 36.4 86.6 45.6 41.1 24.2 10.5 13.7 8.6 5.1
1997 209.9 167.3 40.2 127.1 62.9 64.2 42.6 21.1 21.5 13.3 8.2
1998 105.7 90.6 19.3 71.3 35.0 36.3 15.1 7.6 7.5 3.2 4.3
1999 81.5 66.1 15.8 50.2 25.8 24.4 15.4 4.1 11.3 4.0 7.3
2000 140.1 125.4 27.1 98.2 47.0 51.2 14.7 3.9 10.8 5.0 5.8
2001 97.3 79.5 19.9 59.6 31.6 28.0 17.7 4.1 13.7 6.6 7.0
2002 81.4 63.3 18.7 44.5 27.4 17.1 18.1 3.4 14.7 11.2 3.5
2003 102.9 76.2 18.2 58.0 36.3 21.7 26.7 2.5 24.3 10.0 14.3
2004* 64.7 48.2 10.0 38.2 24.2 14.0 16.5 4.3 12.2 5.1 7.0
Total 1594.1 1339.3 375.4 963.9 527.8 436.1 254.8 94.5 160.2 88.5 71.7
% of total 84.0 23.5 60.5 33.1 27.4 16.0 5.9 10.1 5.6 4.5
*Through August 2004
Measured in bln. USD. Sum over all the countries listed in Table 1.
Numbers for loans represent the size of facilities, not actual amounts drawn.
39Table 3: Summary of indexes
Concept Variables Notes Indexes
International Terms of trade Scaled by trade 1.1
competitiveness Change in CA openness 1.2
Change in real exchange rate
Export commodity prices Lagged 1 month
Volatility of export revenues
Investment climate and Sovereign credit risk Lagged 1 month 2.1
monetary stability Debt service/Exports 2.2
Investment/GDP




Change in stock market index
Financial development Financial account openness Lagged 1 month 3.1
Comm.bank assets/GDP
Stock market cap./GDP
Long-run macroeconomic Foreign debt/GDP Lagged 1 month 4.1
prospects Growth rate of real GDP 4.2
Growth rate of GDP in USD
Unemployment rate
Political stability ICRG political stability index Lagged 1 month 5.1
Global supply of capital Gross capital outﬂows from OECD Not lagged 6.1
Investor conﬁdence index 6.2
US Treasury rate
ML High Yield Spread
Growth rate of US stock mkt. index
40Table 4: Sample industries in exporting and non-exporting categories
Exporting Non-exporting
Chemicals Food and drinks
International airlines and shipping TV and radio services
Oil and gas industry Communication services
Motor vehicles Construction and related
Minerals and timber Utilities
Electric services Retail
Manufactured goods Restaurants, hotels, leisure
Agricultural products Electric services
Food, drinks, tobacco Transportation and storage
Steel and aluminum Domestic airlines and shipping
Note: some industries appear in both columns due to diﬀerent export structure of diﬀerent countries.
41Table 5: Eﬀects of debt renegotiations and restructuring on total amount borrowed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Month renegotiations began -12.01 -7.84 -8.49 -7.33 -12.5
(10.04) (13.85) (17.97) (14.15) (14.43)
Renegotiations continue -30.13*** -18.80** -18.39*** -14.74* -20.14**
(7.25) (9.38) (6.44) (8.81) (8.92)
Month of debt restructuring -44.37*** -23.36** -23.80** -22.84** -27.05**
(11.65) (11.82) (10.58) (11.17) (12.39)
Year 1 since debt restructuring -43.70*** -29.67*** -29.49*** -26.94*** -32.50***
(8.04) (9.30) (6.00) (9.21) (10.45)
Year 2 since debt restructuring -34.26*** -23.99** -23.72*** -20.38** -23.62**
(8.86) (9.90) (6.31) (9.30) (9.95)
Year 3 since debt restructuring -17.99** -20.96** -21.31*** -18.26** -20.69**
(8.83) (9.28) (7.07) (7.85) (8.18)
Index 1.1 -5.07 -5.41 -5.52*** -4.20 -3.61
Index 1.2 0.73 0.81 0.74 0.92 0.95
Index 2.1 3.46 2.04 2.08 1.87 0.56
Index 2.2 -1.34 -2.20 -2.13 -2.38 -2.63
Index 2.3 -1.94 -2.36 -2.32 -3.61** -4.18**
Index 3.1 6.43** 6.29** 5.69*** 5.76** 5.50**
Index 4.1 3.07** 2.98** 3.03*** 2.68** 2.65**
Index 4.2 -0.37 -0.41 -0.33 -0.24 0.04
Index 5.1 1.03*** 0.93*** 0.97*** 0.84*** 0.79***
Index 6.1 -17.42*** -16.72*** -15.96*** -15.97*** -15.80***
Index 6.2 18.78*** 18.57*** 17.86*** 16.57*** 16.79***
Real exchange rate -13.17*** -11.42*** -11.14*** -9.73*** -9.27***
Banking crisis indicator -25.07*** -26.05*** -25.55*** -25.92*** -25.84***
IMF agreement indicator -19.20*** -12.50* -12.48*** -11.85* -10.52*
Lagged dependent variable 0.083*** *country
Constant -74.88*** -57.28*** -76.88*** 49.88*** -72.34*** -74.65***
Observations 5515 9186 5515 5485 5244 5244
Adjusted R2 0.20 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.21
ρ (AR) 0.08
Dependent variable: total amount borrowed in percentage deviations from the mean.
Country and year ﬁxed eﬀects are included in all regressions.
Robust standard errors clustered on country are in parentheses.
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. 42Table 6: Eﬀects of debt renegotiations and restructuring by type of borrower
Financial Nonﬁnancial
All Exporting Not exporting
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Month renegotiations began 20.15 4.84 1.62 -13.62**
(15.82) (18.46) (14.43) (6.07)
Renegotiations continue -0.47 -16.56* -3.64 -12.60**
(11.14) (9.22) (6.98) (5.94)
Month of debt restructuring -0.78 -8.86 -9.67 3.95
(10.70) (12.36) (10.16) (15.13)
Year 1 since debt restructuring -5.08 -25.30** -23.42*** -8.34
(8.09) (10.00) (7.99) (6.67)
Year 2 since debt restructuring -6.43 -18.41* -21.79** -9.31
(8.33) (10.45) (8.98) (8.89)
Year 3 since debt restructuring -3.77 -19.24* -19.88** -8.61
(7.15) (10.05) (10.03) (6.53)
Index 1.1 -3.40 -4.67 -1.91 -4.67
Index 1.2 1.14** 0.70 -0.47 1.48**
Index 2.1 2.45 2.02 1.96 3.35
Index 2.2 -1.23 -2.87 -3.50 1.21
Index 2.3 0.01 -1.13 -1.60 2.15*
Index 3.1 5.12* 4.78** 5.14** 1.58
Index 4.1 2.53* 2.25 2.23 0.38
Index 4.2 -0.14 -2.85 -0.48 -2.39
Index 5.1 0.35 0.69*** 0.50* 0.50**
Index 6.1 -5.51 -15.56** -12.91*** -8.23**
Index 6.2 1.74 16.43*** 8.79** 8.60**
Real exchange rate -6.63** -8.70*** -6.53*** -5.57***
Banking crisis indicator -16.26 -20.56* -11.90 -12.58
IMF agreement indicator -10.21 -15.71*** -4.59 -9.87*
Constant -43.21** -88.22*** -76.99*** -62.47*
Observations 5504 5480 5442 5466
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.18
Dependent variable: total amount borrowed by sector in percentage deviations from the mean.
Robust standard errors clustered on country are in parentheses.
Year and country ﬁxed eﬀects are included.
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. 43Table 7: Eﬀects of diﬀerent types of restructuring
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Month renegotiations began -5.07 -5.87 -6.07 -1.65
(14.28) (13.40) (14.24) (13.74)
Renegotiations continue -16.60* -16.75* -15.57* -8.16
(8.83) (9.58) (8.01) (7.72)
No buybacks No new Oﬃcial Intersection of
and swaps (a) money (b) (c) (a) (b) (c)
Month of debt restructuring -39.68*** -18.62 -44.60*** -33.5***
(11.24) (11.66) (14.75) (13.0)
Year 1 since debt restructuring -41.10*** -28.54*** -46.44*** -43.6***
(9.95) (8.74) (10.69) (10.2)
Year 2 since debt restructuring -29.22*** -29.66*** -28.64*** -37.3***
(10.13) (9.52) (10.57) (10.2)
Year 3 since debt restructuring -26.62** -28.84*** -27.60** -43.7***
(11.08) (8.19) (11.14) (11.0)
Buybacks New
and swaps money Commercial
Month of debt restructuring 16.08 -15.53 -4.43
(20.61) (12.65) (11.68)
Year 1 since debt restructuring 10.44 -11.26 -10.57
(12.48) (10.59) (8.08)
Year 2 since debt restructuring 4.27 -23.47*** -16.01**
(11.82) (7.53) (7.15)
Year 3 since debt restructuring 12.08 -27.86*** -21.58***
(14.32) (9.16) (5.78)
Constant -76.67*** -77.62*** -74.70*** -74.24***
(19.96) (20.83) (20.78) (21.95)
Observations 5515 5515 5515 5515
Adjusted R2 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.20
Dependent variable: total amount borrowed in percentage deviations from the mean.
Robust standard errors clustered on country are in parentheses.
Year and country ﬁxed eﬀects and all control variables are included.
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
44Table 8: Robustness tests
Average size Number National Year Year Year
of loan/issue of loans/issues currency < 1999 < 1991 > 1990
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Month renegotiations 14.40 33.39 -5.40 -4.40 -16.05* -9.75
began (49.71) (34.26) (16.04) (15.33) (8.50) (27.44)
Renegotiations -55.40*** -25.81* -13.87** -14.81* -4.74 -35.10**
continue (13.11) (15.30) (6.90) (8.85) (4.68) (16.44)
Month of debt -46.20** -47.76* 4.54 -21.42* -5.83 -27.05
restructuring (23.32) (24.74) (18.01) (11.55) (8.88) (16.58)
Year 1 since debt -35.58* -48.44*** -18.91* -20.13* -5.44 -36.88***
restructuring (21.23) (15.31) (11.31) (10.59) (10.10) (12.08)
Year 2 since debt -52.92*** -40.23** -17.45 -12.12 -1.22 -28.01**
restructuring (18.00) (17.40) (11.67) (11.45) (7.63) (11.04)
Year 3 since debt 8.67 -19.03 -18.43* -12.40 -15.70** -24.16**
restructuring (26.24) (26.44) (9.67) (8.99) (6.62) (11.09)
Index 1.1 0.74 -8.41 -3.98 -0.82 -1.75 -7.17*
Index 1.2 -0.18 -0.23 1.80* -0.04 0.48 0.62
Index 2.1 6.74 3.15 3.14 1.12 0.78 4.37
Index 2.2 -7.19* -6.22* -2.02 -2.57 1.32 -3.95
Index 2.3 -4.41 -7.46* -0.66 -3.16 2.52 -2.32
Index 3.1 12.56** 11.76** 5.59** 9.15** -4.43 6.04*
Index 4.1 4.09* 5.55* -0.32 4.42** 5.65 1.19
Index 4.2 1.07 -4.14 -3.20 1.91 1.58 -2.61
Index 5.1 1.02** 1.75*** 0.39 0.78*** 0.10 1.17***
Index 6.1 -30.25 -29.95*** -20.95*** -51.26*** -17.28 -15.63**
Index 6.2 23.12* 38.57*** 14.41*** 37.66*** 16.52 18.60***
Banking crisis -15.89 -18.19 -17.40** -16.73* -16.41*** -19.98
IMF agreement -15.46 -18.82 -12.91* -10.53 3.28 -20.28***
Real exchange rate -0.55 -9.07 -15.18*** 3.41 -10.27**
Constant -61.59 -90.59 -5.85 121.69*** -31.93 -85.86***
Observations 5826 5826 5962 4186 1697 3818
Adjusted R2 0.05 0.06 0.22 0.25 0.11 0.17
Dependent variables in percentage deviations from the mean.
Robust standard errors clustered on country are in parentheses.
Year and country ﬁxed eﬀects are included.
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. 45Table 9: Data formats and sources
Variable Frequency Units Source
Primary bond issues by issue #, US$ Bondware
spread by issue bp Bondware
maturity by issue years Bondware
Syndicated loan contracts by contract #, US$ Loanware
spread by contract bp Loanware
maturity by contract years Loanware
Export industries constant list CIA Factbook, UNCTAD
Secondary bond spreads monthly bp Bloomberg, Datastream, etc.
Onset of renegotiations by event date Lexis–Nexis news
Debt restructuring by event date Paris Club, GDF (2002)
Terms of trade annual index UNCTAD
Current account monthly US$ IFS line 78al
Real exchange rate monthly index IFS line rec
Export commodity prices monthly index Authors’ calculations (see text)
Exchange rate regime monthly list Reinhart & Rogoﬀ (2004)
Exports monthly n.c.units IFS line 90c
Imports monthly n.c.units IFS line 98c
GDP monthly n.c.units IFS line 99b, GFD
Debt service monthly US$ BIS-IMF-OECD-WB data
Investment monthly n.c.units IFS line 93e
Lending rate monthly percent IFS line 60p
Deposit rate monthly percent IFS line 60l
CPI inﬂation rate monthly percent IFS line 64x
Nominal exchange rate monthly n.c./US$ IFS line
Domestic credit monthly n.c.units IFS line
Sovereign credit rating monthly index S&P, Moody’s, EIU
Stock market indexes monthly index Ibbotson, GFD, Bloomberg
Stock market cap. monthly n.c.units GFD
Comm. banks assets monthly n.c.units IFS lines 20-22
Capital access annual index Milken Institute
Fin. account openness annual index IMF, Glick and Hutchison (2005)
Total foreign debt quarterly US$ Joint BIS-IMF-OECD-WB data
Industrial production monthly index WB
Unemployment rate monthly percent IFS line 67r, GFD
Political stability monthly index ICRG
Investor conﬁdence monthly index Yale SOM
US stock market index monthly index GFD
US Treasury rate monthly percent Federal Reserve
Gross capital outﬂows monthly US$ Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (1999)
EMBI index monthly index J.P.Morgan/Bloomberg
IMF program monthly binary IMF web site
Systemic sudden stop monthly binary Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2006)
Sudden stop annual binary Frankel and Cavallo (2004)
Banking crisis indicator annual binary Hutchison and Noy (2005)
Note: See text for description of Bondware and Loanware, GDF is World Bank’s Global Devel-
opment Finance, IFS is International Financial Statistics, GFD is Global Financial Data, EIU is
Economist Intelligence Unit, ICRG is International Country Risk Data. Most data sets are available
through Yale University Library.
46T
a
b
l
e
1
0
:
D
e
b
t
r
e
n
e
g
o
t
i
a
t
i
o
n
s
a
n
d
r
e
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
d
a
t
a
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
N
e
g
o
t
i
a
t
i
o
n
s
s
t
a
r
t
d
a
t
e
N
e
w
s
s
o
u
r
c
e
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
d
a
t
e
R
e
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
t
y
p
e
C
r
e
d
i
t
o
r
s
N
e
w
m
o
n
e
y
?
A
l
g
e
r
i
a
N
o
v
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
9
0
W
S
J
1
0
/
1
8
/
1
9
9
0
,
p
.
A
1
2
,
c
o
l
.
2
F
e
b
r
u
a
r
y
1
9
9
2
M
a
t
u
r
i
t
y
e
x
t
e
n
s
i
o
n
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
9
3
J
o
u
r
n
a
l
o
f
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
e
1
2
/
2
0
/
1
9
9
3
,
p
.
B
4
,
c
o
l
.
2
J
u
n
e
1
9
9
4
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
N
o
”
J
u
n
e
1
9
9
5
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
”
J
u
l
y
1
9
9
5
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
N
o
A
r
g
e
n
t
i
n
a
A
u
g
u
s
t
1
9
8
2
W
a
s
h
i
n
g
t
o
n
P
o
s
t
9
/
1
/
1
9
8
2
,
p
.
D
7
A
u
g
u
s
t
1
9
8
3
C
o
n
c
e
r
t
e
d
l
e
n
d
i
n
g
C
o
m
m
e
r
i
c
a
l
Y
e
s
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
8
3
F
T
1
2
/
1
5
/
1
9
8
3
,
p
.
I
4
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
1
9
8
5
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
N
o
S
e
p
t
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
8
4
F
T
9
/
2
7
/
1
9
8
4
,
p
.
I
1
A
u
g
u
s
t
1
9
8
5
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
Y
e
s
S
e
p
t
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
8
6
T
h
e
G
u
a
r
d
i
a
n
9
/
1
/
1
9
8
6
M
a
y
1
9
8
7
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
N
o
”
A
u
g
u
s
t
1
9
8
7
M
a
t
u
r
i
t
y
e
x
t
e
n
s
i
o
n
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
Y
e
s
”
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
8
9
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
N
o
”
S
e
p
t
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
9
1
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
N
o
”
J
u
l
y
1
9
9
2
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
N
o
”
A
p
r
i
l
1
9
9
3
B
r
a
d
y
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
N
.
A
.
S
e
p
t
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
9
7
S
w
a
p
C
o
m
m
e
r
i
c
a
l
N
o
N
.
A
.
M
a
r
c
h
1
9
9
8
B
u
y
b
a
c
k
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
N
.
A
.
S
e
p
t
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
9
8
B
u
y
b
a
c
k
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
N
.
A
.
M
a
r
c
h
1
9
9
9
S
w
a
p
+
B
u
y
b
a
c
k
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
N
.
A
.
F
e
b
r
u
a
r
y
2
0
0
0
S
w
a
p
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
N
.
A
.
J
u
n
e
2
0
0
0
S
w
a
p
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
N
.
A
.
F
e
b
r
u
a
r
y
2
0
0
1
S
w
a
p
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
N
.
A
.
J
u
n
e
2
0
0
1
S
w
a
p
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
0
1
F
T
0
1
/
3
1
/
2
0
0
1
,
p
.
5
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
0
1
S
w
a
p
C
o
m
m
e
r
i
c
a
l
N
o
B
r
a
z
i
l
S
e
p
t
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
8
2
F
T
9
/
1
8
/
1
9
8
2
,
p
.
I
2
F
e
b
r
u
a
r
y
1
9
8
3
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
C
o
m
m
e
r
i
c
a
l
Y
e
s
”
N
o
v
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
8
3
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
N
o
”
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
1
9
8
4
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
C
o
m
m
e
r
i
c
a
l
Y
e
s
”
J
u
l
y
1
9
8
6
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
C
o
m
m
e
r
i
c
a
l
N
o
”
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
1
9
8
7
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
N
o
”
J
u
l
y
1
9
8
8
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
N
o
”
N
o
v
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
8
8
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
Y
e
s
S
e
p
t
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
8
9
W
a
s
h
i
n
g
t
o
n
P
o
s
t
9
/
1
9
/
1
9
8
9
,
p
.
C
1
F
e
b
r
u
a
r
y
1
9
9
2
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
N
o
”
J
u
l
y
1
9
9
2
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
1
9
9
3
F
T
1
/
9
/
1
9
9
3
,
p
.
3
A
p
r
i
l
1
9
9
4
B
r
a
d
y
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
9
6
G
a
z
e
t
a
M
e
r
c
a
n
t
i
l
O
n
l
i
n
e
1
2
/
1
7
/
1
9
9
6
J
u
l
y
1
9
9
7
S
w
a
p
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
N
.
A
.
A
p
r
i
l
1
9
9
9
S
w
a
p
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
N
.
A
.
O
c
t
o
b
e
r
1
9
9
9
S
w
a
p
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
N
.
A
.
M
a
r
c
h
2
0
0
0
S
w
a
p
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
N
.
A
.
J
u
l
y
2
0
0
0
S
w
a
p
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
N
.
A
.
A
u
g
u
s
t
2
0
0
0
S
w
a
p
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
N
.
A
.
M
a
r
c
h
2
0
0
1
S
w
a
p
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
C
h
i
l
e
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
1
9
8
3
F
T
1
/
2
5
/
1
9
8
3
,
p
.
I
3
J
u
l
y
1
9
8
3
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
Y
e
s
N
o
v
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
8
3
N
Y
T
1
1
/
0
3
/
1
9
8
3
,
p
.
D
4
,
c
o
l
.
1
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
1
9
8
4
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
”
J
u
n
e
1
9
8
4
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
Y
e
s
C
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
o
n
N
e
x
t
P
a
g
e
.
.
.
47T
a
b
l
e
1
0
–
C
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
N
e
g
o
t
i
a
t
i
o
n
s
s
t
a
r
t
d
a
t
e
N
e
w
s
s
o
u
r
c
e
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
d
a
t
e
R
e
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
t
y
p
e
C
r
e
d
i
t
o
r
s
N
e
w
m
o
n
e
y
?
”
N
o
v
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
8
4
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
”
J
u
l
y
1
9
8
5
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
”
N
o
v
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
8
5
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
Y
e
s
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
8
5
N
Y
T
1
2
/
2
7
/
1
9
8
5
,
p
.
D
1
0
,
c
o
l
.
6
A
p
r
i
l
1
9
8
7
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
N
o
”
J
u
n
e
1
9
8
7
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
1
9
8
8
W
S
J
1
/
1
4
/
1
9
8
8
,
p
.
1
6
,
c
o
l
.
1
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
9
0
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
Y
e
s
M
a
y
1
9
8
8
F
T
5
/
2
0
/
1
9
8
8
,
p
.
I
4
6
A
u
g
u
s
t
1
9
8
8
B
u
y
b
a
c
k
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
C
o
l
o
m
b
i
a
O
c
t
o
b
e
r
1
9
8
3
F
T
1
0
/
2
0
/
1
9
8
3
,
p
.
I
2
2
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
8
5
C
o
n
c
e
r
t
e
d
l
e
n
d
i
n
g
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
Y
e
s
J
u
l
y
1
9
8
7
F
T
7
/
2
1
/
1
9
8
7
,
p
.
I
4
J
u
n
e
1
9
8
9
C
o
n
c
e
r
t
e
d
l
e
n
d
i
n
g
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
Y
e
s
M
a
r
c
h
1
9
9
0
N
Y
T
3
/
0
8
/
1
9
9
0
,
p
.
D
2
0
,
c
o
l
.
6
A
p
r
i
l
1
9
9
1
C
o
n
c
e
r
t
e
d
l
e
n
d
i
n
g
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
J
u
n
e
1
9
9
9
F
T
6
/
2
2
/
1
9
9
9
,
p
.
7
A
p
r
i
l
2
0
0
1
S
w
a
p
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
C
r
o
a
t
i
a
M
a
y
1
9
9
2
J
o
u
r
n
a
l
o
f
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
e
5
/
2
8
/
1
9
9
2
,
p
.
A
3
,
c
o
l
.
1
M
a
r
c
h
1
9
9
5
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
N
o
E
g
y
p
t
J
u
n
e
1
9
8
3
N
Y
T
7
/
2
2
/
1
9
8
3
,
p
.
A
2
,
c
o
l
.
1
M
a
y
1
9
8
7
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
N
o
M
a
r
c
h
1
9
9
1
F
T
3
/
1
8
/
1
9
9
1
,
p
.
I
4
M
a
y
1
9
9
1
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
N
o
I
n
d
o
n
e
s
i
a
O
c
t
o
b
e
r
1
9
9
7
F
T
1
0
/
0
9
/
1
9
9
7
,
p
.
4
J
u
n
e
1
9
9
8
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
”
S
e
p
t
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
9
8
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
N
o
”
A
p
r
i
l
2
0
0
0
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
N
o
K
o
r
e
a
A
u
g
u
s
t
1
9
9
7
S
y
d
n
e
y
M
o
r
n
i
n
g
H
e
r
a
l
d
8
/
2
9
/
1
9
9
7
,
p
.
2
8
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
1
9
9
8
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
M
e
x
i
c
o
A
u
g
u
s
t
1
9
8
2
N
Y
T
8
/
2
0
/
1
9
8
2
,
p
.
A
1
,
c
o
l
.
1
J
u
n
e
1
9
8
3
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
N
o
”
A
u
g
u
s
t
1
9
8
3
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
Y
e
s
”
A
p
r
i
l
1
9
8
4
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
Y
e
s
”
M
a
r
c
h
1
9
8
5
M
u
l
t
i
y
e
a
r
r
e
s
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
”
A
u
g
u
s
t
1
9
8
5
M
u
l
t
i
y
e
a
r
r
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
”
O
c
t
o
b
e
r
1
9
8
5
M
a
t
u
r
i
t
y
e
x
t
e
n
s
i
o
n
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
J
u
n
e
1
9
8
5
F
T
6
/
1
1
/
1
9
8
5
,
p
.
I
1
5
S
e
p
t
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
8
6
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
N
o
”
M
a
r
c
h
1
9
8
7
D
e
f
e
r
m
e
n
t
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
Y
e
s
”
A
u
g
u
s
t
1
9
8
7
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
”
M
a
r
c
h
1
9
8
8
S
w
a
p
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
”
M
a
y
1
9
8
9
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
N
o
”
M
a
r
c
h
1
9
9
0
B
r
a
d
y
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
Y
e
s
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
9
4
N
Y
T
1
2
/
2
2
/
1
9
9
4
,
p
.
D
1
,
c
o
l
.
3
M
a
y
1
9
9
6
S
w
a
p
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
N
.
A
.
S
e
p
t
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
9
6
S
w
a
p
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
N
.
A
.
A
u
g
u
s
t
1
9
9
9
S
w
a
p
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
N
.
A
.
O
c
t
o
b
e
r
1
9
9
9
S
w
a
p
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
N
.
A
.
M
a
r
c
h
2
0
0
0
B
u
y
b
a
c
k
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
N
.
A
.
S
e
p
t
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
0
0
B
u
y
b
a
c
k
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
N
.
A
.
O
c
t
o
b
e
r
2
0
0
0
B
u
y
b
a
c
k
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
N
.
A
.
N
o
v
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
0
0
B
u
y
b
a
c
k
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
N
.
A
.
M
a
r
c
h
2
0
0
1
S
w
a
p
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
N
.
A
.
A
p
r
i
l
2
0
0
1
B
u
y
b
a
c
k
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
N
.
A
.
M
a
y
2
0
0
1
B
u
y
b
a
c
k
,
S
w
a
p
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
N
.
A
.
A
u
g
u
s
t
2
0
0
1
S
w
a
p
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
C
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
o
n
N
e
x
t
P
a
g
e
.
.
.
48T
a
b
l
e
1
0
–
C
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
N
e
g
o
t
i
a
t
i
o
n
s
s
t
a
r
t
d
a
t
e
N
e
w
s
s
o
u
r
c
e
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
d
a
t
e
R
e
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
t
y
p
e
C
r
e
d
i
t
o
r
s
N
e
w
m
o
n
e
y
?
N
.
A
.
O
c
t
o
b
e
r
2
0
0
1
B
u
y
b
a
c
k
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
N
.
A
.
N
o
v
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
0
1
B
u
y
b
a
c
k
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
P
a
k
i
s
t
a
n
N
.
A
.
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
1
9
8
1
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
N
o
A
u
g
u
s
t
1
9
9
8
W
S
J
8
/
0
6
/
1
9
9
8
,
p
.
A
1
2
,
c
o
l
.
5
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
1
9
9
9
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
N
o
N
o
v
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
0
0
F
T
1
1
/
3
0
/
2
0
0
0
,
p
.
5
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
2
0
0
1
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
N
o
O
c
t
o
b
e
r
2
0
0
1
F
T
1
0
/
3
0
/
2
0
0
1
,
p
.
1
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
0
1
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
N
o
P
e
r
u
F
e
b
r
u
a
r
y
1
9
8
3
F
T
3
/
0
1
/
1
9
8
3
,
p
.
I
1
8
J
u
l
y
1
9
8
3
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
Y
e
s
”
J
u
l
y
1
9
8
3
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
N
o
O
c
t
o
b
e
r
1
9
8
3
N
Y
T
1
0
/
2
7
/
1
9
8
3
,
p
.
D
1
4
,
c
o
l
.
4
J
u
n
e
1
9
8
4
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
N
o
M
a
r
c
h
1
9
9
1
W
S
J
3
/
1
3
/
1
9
9
1
,
p
.
A
1
0
,
c
o
l
.
3
S
e
p
t
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
9
1
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
N
o
”
M
a
y
1
9
9
3
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
N
o
M
a
y
1
9
9
5
F
T
5
/
0
6
/
1
9
9
5
,
p
.
3
J
u
l
y
1
9
9
6
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
N
o
”
N
o
v
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
9
6
B
r
a
d
y
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
P
h
i
l
i
p
p
i
n
e
s
O
c
t
o
b
e
r
1
9
8
3
F
T
1
0
/
1
3
/
1
9
8
3
,
p
.
I
1
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
8
4
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
N
o
F
e
b
r
u
a
r
y
1
9
8
5
W
S
J
2
/
2
6
/
1
9
8
5
,
p
.
3
9
,
c
o
l
.
5
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
1
9
8
6
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
Y
e
s
O
c
t
o
b
e
r
1
9
8
6
J
o
u
r
n
a
l
o
f
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
e
1
0
/
2
3
/
1
9
8
6
,
p
.
4
A
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
1
9
8
7
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
N
o
A
p
r
i
l
1
9
8
7
J
o
u
r
n
a
l
o
f
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
e
4
/
1
6
/
1
9
8
7
,
p
.
1
,
c
o
l
.
4
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
8
7
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
J
u
n
e
1
9
8
8
T
h
e
T
o
r
o
n
t
o
S
t
a
r
6
/
0
6
/
1
9
8
8
M
a
y
1
9
8
9
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
N
o
N
.
A
.
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
1
9
9
0
B
r
a
d
y
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
Y
e
s
J
u
l
y
1
9
9
0
W
S
J
7
/
2
6
/
1
9
9
0
,
p
.
A
1
2
,
c
o
l
.
2
J
u
n
e
1
9
9
1
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
N
o
”
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
9
2
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
Y
e
s
N
.
A
.
J
u
l
y
1
9
9
4
A
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
c
a
n
c
e
l
e
d
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
N
o
N
.
A
.
S
e
p
t
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
9
6
S
w
a
p
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
N
.
A
.
O
c
t
o
b
e
r
1
9
9
9
S
w
a
p
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
P
o
l
a
n
d
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
1
9
8
1
N
Y
T
1
2
/
2
2
/
1
9
8
0
,
p
.
D
6
,
c
o
l
.
4
A
p
r
i
l
1
9
8
1
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
N
o
”
A
p
r
i
l
1
9
8
2
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
”
N
o
v
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
8
2
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
A
p
r
i
l
1
9
8
2
N
Y
T
4
/
0
7
/
1
9
8
2
,
p
.
D
1
,
c
o
l
.
6
N
o
v
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
8
3
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
M
a
r
c
h
1
9
8
4
N
Y
T
3
/
2
2
/
1
9
8
4
,
p
.
D
1
2
,
c
o
l
.
6
J
u
l
y
1
9
8
4
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
”
J
u
n
e
1
9
8
5
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
N
o
”
N
o
v
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
8
5
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
N
o
M
a
r
c
h
1
9
8
6
F
T
3
/
1
4
/
1
9
8
6
,
p
.
I
2
N
o
v
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
8
6
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
8
6
N
Y
T
1
/
0
1
/
1
9
8
7
,
p
.
4
7
,
c
o
l
.
1
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
8
7
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
N
o
”
J
u
l
y
1
9
8
8
M
u
l
t
i
y
e
a
r
r
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
”
J
u
n
e
1
9
8
9
M
a
t
u
r
i
t
y
e
x
t
e
n
s
i
o
n
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
8
9
T
o
r
o
n
t
o
S
t
a
r
1
2
/
1
6
/
1
9
8
9
,
p
.
C
2
F
e
b
r
u
a
r
y
1
9
9
0
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
N
o
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
1
9
9
1
F
T
1
/
1
8
/
1
9
9
1
,
p
.
I
7
A
p
r
i
l
1
9
9
1
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
N
o
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
1
9
9
3
F
T
1
/
3
0
/
1
9
9
3
,
p
.
2
O
c
t
o
b
e
r
1
9
9
4
B
r
a
d
y
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
N
.
A
.
O
c
t
o
b
e
r
2
0
0
0
B
u
y
b
a
c
k
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
N
o
v
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
8
1
N
Y
T
1
1
/
0
4
/
1
9
8
1
,
p
.
D
1
4
,
c
o
l
.
1
J
u
l
y
1
9
8
2
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
N
o
”
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
8
2
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
1
9
8
3
W
a
s
h
i
n
g
t
o
n
P
o
s
t
1
/
0
4
/
1
9
8
3
,
p
.
D
6
M
a
y
1
9
8
3
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
N
o
C
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
o
n
N
e
x
t
P
a
g
e
.
.
.
49T
a
b
l
e
1
0
–
C
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
N
e
g
o
t
i
a
t
i
o
n
s
s
t
a
r
t
d
a
t
e
N
e
w
s
s
o
u
r
c
e
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
d
a
t
e
R
e
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
t
y
p
e
C
r
e
d
i
t
o
r
s
N
e
w
m
o
n
e
y
?
”
J
u
n
e
1
9
8
3
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
J
u
n
e
1
9
8
6
T
h
e
G
u
a
r
d
i
a
n
6
/
0
5
/
1
9
8
6
S
e
p
t
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
8
6
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
”
S
e
p
t
e
m
b
e
b
r
1
9
8
7
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
R
u
s
s
i
a
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
1
9
9
1
J
o
u
r
n
a
l
o
f
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
e
1
/
1
1
/
1
9
9
1
,
p
.
A
3
,
c
o
l
.
1
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
9
1
M
a
t
u
r
i
t
y
e
x
t
e
n
s
i
o
n
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
1
9
9
2
T
h
e
T
i
m
e
s
1
/
1
1
/
1
9
8
2
A
p
r
i
l
1
9
9
3
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
N
o
”
J
u
l
y
1
9
9
3
A
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
c
a
n
c
e
l
e
d
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
”
J
u
n
e
1
9
9
4
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
N
o
”
J
u
n
e
1
9
9
5
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
N
o
”
N
o
v
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
9
5
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
”
A
p
r
i
l
1
9
9
6
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
N
o
A
u
g
u
s
t
1
9
9
8
T
h
e
D
a
i
l
y
T
e
l
e
g
r
a
p
h
8
/
2
0
/
1
9
9
8
,
p
.
5
7
N
o
v
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
9
8
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
”
A
u
g
u
s
t
1
9
9
9
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
O
ﬃ
c
i
a
l
N
o
”
F
e
b
r
u
a
r
y
2
0
0
0
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
S
o
u
t
h
A
f
r
i
c
a
A
u
g
u
s
t
1
9
8
5
T
h
e
T
i
m
e
s
8
/
2
9
/
1
9
8
5
S
e
p
t
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
8
5
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
”
M
a
r
c
h
1
9
8
6
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
”
M
a
r
c
h
1
9
8
7
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
”
O
c
t
o
b
e
r
1
9
8
9
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
A
p
r
i
l
1
9
9
3
T
h
e
G
u
a
r
d
i
a
n
4
/
2
8
/
1
9
9
3
,
p
.
1
7
S
e
p
t
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
9
3
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
T
u
r
k
e
y
F
e
b
r
u
a
r
y
1
9
7
9
W
a
s
h
i
n
g
t
o
n
P
o
s
t
2
/
0
5
/
1
9
7
9
,
p
.
A
1
M
a
r
c
h
1
9
8
2
D
e
f
e
r
m
e
n
t
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
J
u
l
y
1
9
9
8
W
S
J
7
/
0
2
/
1
9
9
8
,
p
.
A
1
7
,
c
o
l
.
1
J
u
n
e
2
0
0
1
S
w
a
p
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
V
e
n
e
z
u
e
l
a
A
p
r
i
l
1
9
8
1
N
Y
T
4
/
0
9
/
1
9
8
1
,
p
.
D
1
7
,
c
o
l
.
4
F
e
b
r
u
a
r
y
1
9
8
6
M
u
l
t
i
y
e
a
r
a
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
1
9
8
6
N
Y
T
1
/
2
8
/
1
9
8
6
,
p
.
D
7
,
c
o
l
.
3
N
o
v
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
8
7
D
e
f
e
r
m
e
n
t
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
Y
e
s
”
S
e
p
t
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
8
8
D
e
f
e
r
m
e
n
t
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
M
a
r
c
h
1
9
8
8
F
T
3
/
0
3
/
1
9
8
8
,
p
.
I
1
4
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
8
8
S
w
a
p
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
8
8
T
o
r
o
n
t
o
S
t
a
r
1
/
0
1
/
1
9
8
9
,
p
.
H
5
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
9
0
B
r
a
d
y
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
Y
e
s
N
.
A
.
S
e
p
t
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
9
7
S
w
a
p
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
1
9
9
4
M
i
a
m
i
H
e
r
a
l
d
3
/
0
6
/
1
9
9
4
,
p
.
K
1
,
c
o
l
.
2
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
1
9
9
7
B
r
a
d
y
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
N
o
N
o
t
e
:
T
h
e
d
a
t
e
o
f
a
r
t
i
c
l
e
d
o
e
s
n
o
t
a
l
w
a
y
s
c
o
r
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
t
o
t
h
e
d
a
t
e
o
f
t
h
e
r
e
n
e
g
o
t
i
a
t
i
o
n
s
o
n
-
s
e
t
.
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
d
a
t
a
i
s
f
r
o
m
G
l
o
b
a
l
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
F
i
n
a
n
c
e
2
0
0
2
,
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
2
a
n
d
3
.
A
r
g
e
n
t
i
n
e
a
n
d
e
b
t
c
r
i
s
i
s
o
f
2
0
0
1
i
s
n
o
t
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
d
.
N
.
A
.
=
W
e
w
e
r
e
n
o
t
a
b
l
e
t
o
ﬁ
n
d
t
h
e
m
a
t
c
h
i
n
g
n
e
w
s
r
e
g
a
r
d
i
n
g
r
e
n
e
g
o
t
i
a
t
i
o
n
s
.
”
=
R
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
i
n
g
f
o
l
l
o
w
s
t
h
e
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
i
n
g
r
e
n
e
g
o
t
i
a
t
i
o
n
s
.
50